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STABILITY AND EXCHANGE RATE SYSTEMS
IN A MONETARIST MODEL OF THE BALANCE OF PAYrffiNTS
Stanley i^ischer*
M.I.T,
Introduction t
The fixed versus flexible exchainge rates debate appears destined for as
long a life as any of the stauiding controversies in economics. The standard
arguments need no repetition; they are well outlined by Johnson (1969) and
Kindleberger (1969) . This paper focusses on points which are less often
discussed, (related points are mentioned in Laffer (1973)) but which may be
as significant.
The concern of this paper is with the stability of consumption and the
price level in a single country and in a two country world under regimes of
fixed and flexible exchange rates. The formal examination of the effects of
exchange rate systems on stedsilitv is not new: Mundell (1960) , Stein (1963)
and Tower and Courtney (1974) are among the contributors to the literature.—"
The imoetus for the present paper, however, comes more directlv from oapers
delivered at the first Wingsnread conference by Argy and Kouri (1974) and
McKinnon (1974), In peorticulcu:, one of the aims of the analvsis is to study
McKinnon's suggestion that adoption of a set of rules of the game in a fixed
exchange rate system could lead to better performsince for each countr-/ individ-
* I am grateful to Rudiger Dornbusch for extremely helpful discussions.
-^ References to other literature are provided by Tower and Courtney.
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uallv them would result from each country pursuing apparently stabilizing policies
on its own.
The structure of the paner ia simple: the stability of the price level
and consumption in a single small country under floating auid fixed rates in
the face of monetary and real disturbances are examined in Sections I.A and
I.B. Active monetary policy for the small country under fixed rates is
examined in Section I.e. The analysis of Sections I.A-c is paralleled in
Sections II.A-C for a two country world. Conclusions and comments are presented
in Section III.
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I. A SINGLE SMALL COUNTRY
The gimnlest monetarist model, due to Dornbusch (1973) ist
\ - ^w (1)
\ - ^tS (2)
\ - V \-l <3)
V \-l-««Wl> 0<a < 1 (4)
C^ -W - \ (5)
wh«re L is the demand for money, P the domestic price level, Y domestic real
income and output, P* the foreign price level, e the exchange rate, B the balance
of payments, a an adjustment coefficient, and C consumption.
This is, needless to say, an extremely simnle model; the major shortcoming
from the viewpoint of this paper is that capital flows are ignored. We assume
that domestic output is simply mannaj later we discuss adding a Phillips curve.
For analytical convenience in examining stability, we assume that average rates
of inflation at home and abroad have been agreed on and are identically 2!;ero.
Thus, we abstract from one of the major causes leading to the adoption of flexible
rates. However, there would be little difficulty in extending the analysis of
the flexible exchange rate system to situations in which rates of inflation be-
tween the two countries differ.
The object of enquiry is the steady-state behavior, in particular the variances,
of prices and consumption when the economy is subjected to repeated shocks. We
consider in turn disturbances in the demand for money, the foreign price level,
and real income and the resultant steady state variances of prices and particularly
consumption.-^ We shall assume purely passive monetary policy initially.
-^ Baumol (1961) has emphasized the distinction between the transient response
of a system to a single disturbance and its behavior under repeated shocks.
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I. A Money Demand and Foreign Price Lavel Disturbanceg .
Let the demand for money be represented by
2
where e. is a random variable with mean zero» variance a , and serially
uncorrelated. Let P* - P* and Y « Y for all t.
(i) Floating Rate
Under floating rates with passive monetary policy,
M - M for all t. (7)
Then the balance of payments is always zero, consumntion has zero variance, and
since
M - kP Y + e
,
M - e
Thus
2
is the variance of prices. The corresponding variance of the exchange rate is
easily calculated from (2)
.
(ii) Fixed Rate
Under floating rates, in this simolest model, all adjustment is in prices
and none in quantities. Under a fixed rate, the adjustment is entirely in
quantities and none in prices. Specifically, from (4), in steady state, the
variance of the nominal money stock is
5 -
Then, using (3) and (5) , the variance of real consumotion is:
2 , "3 2
2a a
» p^l-(l-c.)2)
It is clear that similar qualitative results emerge when we consider
foreign price level disturbances: under floating rates, changes in foreign
prices affect only the exchange rate while domestic nrices and consumption do
not vary) under fixed rates, foreign price disturbeuices produce disturbances
in both domestic prices and domestic consumption.
I.B Real Disturbances .
The most interesting comparison between the responses of the two types
of system to disturbances occurs when the disturbance is in domestic income and
output. Let
Y - Y + u (12)
2
where u^ has zero mean, variance a and is serially uncorrelated. Once again,
t u
P* a P* for all t.
(i) Floating Rate
Under floating rates, with passive monetary policy, we have
2 2
, = a (13)
c/p u
and
_ 6 -
without specifying the distribution of u , it is not in general possible to
write down the mean and variance of the price level. It is, however, clear that
the price level has non-zero variance.
(ii) Fixed Rate
From (4) we havej
M^ - {l-a)M^_^ + akP(Y+u^) (15)
Accordingly, the steady-state variance of the nominal money stock is
2 " ^^ '^u
l-(l-a)''
Now rewriting the consumption function (5) and using (4)
t
C M
^ » Y^(l-ak) + "^^^ (17)
It is natural to assume (1-ak) > so that the propensity to consume out of
current income is positive. From (17) we see that there are two sources of
disturbance in consumption: there are changes in current income, which are
smoothed through the balance of payments (via the -nk term) , but also, past
disturbances in the money stock affect current consumption a?? consumers trv
to restore money balance equilibrivim. The variance of real consumption iss
2 4,2 2
a - . a k a
§-= (l-oik)a^ + ^ (18)
l-(l-a)
Now we obvious Iv want to compare the variance of consumption under the
two exchange rate regimes from (13) and (18). Consider the inequality:
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.1 , »2 ^ a k1 > (1-ak) +
l-(l-a)^
With some manipulation this is equivalent to
(l-cxk) + (1-a) > (19)
which is ensured by the assumptions on a and ak. Accordingly, the variance
of consumption in the fixed rate regime is less than that in the floating rate
regime. Th is result reflects the shock absorber role of the balance of pay-
ments under fixed rates. Since there is also no variance of prices under fixed
rates, it is clear that fixed rates are preferable if disturbances are real.
I.C Active Monetary Policy .
Thus far the monetary authority in the small countrv has been purely
passive. Would not more active policies chauige the conclusions reached?
Actually the model should be thought of as one in which there is very little
for the monetary authority to do. It seems natural in the case of each dis-
turbance to assume that the current disturbance does not affect current
monetary policy ~ i.e. that there is at least a one-period recognition and
decision lag for the monetary authority.-^ Accordingly there is nothing the
monetary authority can do to stabilize even prices under flexible rates
where all adjustments to a oarticular disturbance are completed within the
period the disturbance occurs.
Under fixed exchange rates, however, private adjustments to a given
-^ See, however, the discussion in Section III.
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disturbance .ire not completed within a single period since the restoration
of money balances takes place with a distributed lag. There is thus room
for some stabilizing action by tlie government. Specifically, suppose that
money can be freely manufactured (destroyed) and distributed (collected)
by the monetary authority. Let AMG be the government-created money stock
in each period. The balance of payments is no longer given by (3) but rather
by
B - M - (M + AMG.
)
(20)
t t t—i t
The optimal monetary rule under fixed rates with stabilization of consump-
tion as the target is the certainty equivalence rule—" :
AMG - rt(kPY-M ) (21)
In words, the monetary authority orovides that amount of monev which would
put consumntion at its mean level if there were no distrubance in the current
period — i.e. it compensates for oast disturbances.
(i) Money Demand Disturbances
Using equations (4) , (6) , (20) and (21) , we obtain
B^ - o(L^ - M^__j_) - a(kPY-M^_^) (22)
- oi(kPY + e - kPY)
at
i/
This is for the cases of disturbances in money demand and income; the rule
for foreign price disturbances is different.
- 9 -
Substituting into (5) , we obtain
2 2 2
a a. a
:r (23)
which is less than the corresponding variance given in (11) with passive
monetary policy.
(ii) Real Disturbance
We remarked » following equation (17) , that there were two sources of
variation in consumption with real disturbances under fixed rates: the var-
iation arising from the current disturbance and that arising from lagged
adjustment of the money stock. The latter source of variation is removed by
the use of an active monetary policy.
Combining (4) , (12) , (20) and (21) , we obtain
B^ - a(L^- M^_^) - a(kPY-M^_j^) (24)
- a (kP (Y+u ) - kPY)
- akPu
The variance of real consumption is then
2
"c 2 2
- =» (1-ak) a (25)
P u
which is less than the corresponding expression in (18) with passive monetary
policy and is a fortiori less than the variance of consumption under flexible
rates.
It should be noted that although the stabilization instrument above has
been the money stock, there is no reason why fiscal policy could not have been
used to the same effect. In fact, one way one can think of monetary oolicv as
_ 10_
operating here is through lump sum taxes and transfers, so that monetary and
fiscal policy become indistinguishable. Alternatively, one could think of a
commodity stadailization scheme being operated to smooth consumotion. This need
not necess«u:ily be government run.
I.D Price versus Quantity Changes .
If disturbances are real, then a fixed exchange rate system provides
less variance of both consumption and prices than a flexible rate system. With
money demand disturbances, however, fixed rates provide a steOsle price level
and variable consumption while flexible rates yield variable prices and stable
consumption. The question arises of how the variability of prices is to be
compared with the varieibility of consumption in assessing the alternative ex-
change rate systems.
Concavity of utility functions expressed as a function of consumption
justifies concern with the stoJDility of consumption but it is not obvious that
price variability is, of itself, undesirable. Indeed, for a while it was
popular to argue that price variability is desirable.-^ In the context of this
model, two posalbla costs of price Inatabillty suggest themselves t first,
price changes could lead to output changes through Phillips-curve type
phenomena referred to by Lucas (1973) in which entrepreneurs mistake absolute
price changes for relative price changes, or alternatively, because nominal
wages adjust at a different rate than prices; second, it is sometimes argued
that price variability reduces the quality of money. The second argument has
attractive poetic qualities though the first is more plausible.
Consider now adding to the basic model represented by equations (l)-(5)
5/
For references to this literature, and for the resolution of the debate,
see Hanoch (1974)
.
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tho Phillips curve equation
«
y - p,, - $(P. - E. .(P.)) + u. 3 > (26)t y z t-i t t
where y is the mean level of output and E
-i (^u) ^s the expectation of P
conditional on information available up to and including period t-1. The
addition of (26) complicates the model considerably and requires more precise
specification of the distributions of the stochastic terms (as in Section II.
B
below) for the calculation of the relevant means and variances. Since quali-
tative conclusions on stability of consumption with the Phillips curve (26)
in the model deoend on the values of the parameters 6 , a and k it does not
appear useful to develop the analysis at length here. The obvious is, however,
worth stating J the greater is S — the more sensitive is outout to absolute
price level chamge3 -- the more likely is it that consumption is more stable under
fixed than flexible rates, even in response to monetary disturbances.
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II. A TWO-COUNTRY WORLD
The extontion of the results for a single country to a two-country world
is obvious and straightforward for a flexible exchange rate regime in the
simplest model in which there is no Phillips curve. We use the simplest
model throughout this section.
Most equations of the two country model are the same as those of the one-
country model, (l)-(5). Correspondikig to (1), (3), (4) and (5) are identical
equations for the foreign country, but with all variables asterisked. In
addition, with inactive monetary policies, under floating rates we have
(27)
(28)
(29)
where M is the world money supply. We shall, for convenience, assume that
the countries are identical — in size and behavioral parameters — except
for stochastic components of the functions, and under fixed exchange rates we
set the exchange rate at unity.
II.A Money Demand Disturbances .
In the two countries, let
and
L* = kP*Y* + e* (31)
\ m M
M* - M*
\ + eM* B M
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2 2
respoctivoly, A33Uine that e and e* have means zero, variances a and a
t t G E
*
and each serially uncorrelated; the correlation between e and e* will be
apacified below.
(i) Floating Rates
Under floating rates the money demand disturbances work themselves out
entirely in price-changes. If the disturbances are nerfectlv positively
correlated and have the stune variance then tlie exchange rate remains constant,
otherwise it too varies. The rate of consumption is constant through time in
each country. That is, the single countrv conclusions carrv over directly
though the actual variance of prices will be the same for the two cases only
if the disturbances are perfectly correlated.
(ii) Fixed Rates
Under fixed rates the qualitative conclusions of Section I aoply. There
will in general be variability in both prices and consumption in the two
countries. In particular
(a) If the disturbances are perfectly negatively correlated with
e^ " - E* then the orice level in each country is constant and the
t t
variance of consumption in each country is given bv the same formula
(11) as it is for the single country of Section I. To see this, use
(29), (4), (30) and (31): then
M - (l-a)M^_j^ + a(kP^Y+e^) + (l-o)M*_^ + a (kP^Y*+e*)
So, using (29) and (2)
i
M - (c +62)
p . .^1. ^. (32)
t k(Y+Y*)
M
With e^ - - e* then P^ =
^(y^y^^^ for all t.
The remainder of the analysis nroceeds as in Section I.
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(b) If the diaturbeuices in the two countries are perfectly positively
correlated with e c*, then, from (32)
M - 2c
p . . ,. ^.
t k(Y+Y*)
Then using (4) to compute the asymptotic variance of the monev supoly
in the home country:
al => a-a)^al + a^(k'^f^o^ + 2kY cov (P^e^)+a^) (33)M M p t t e
,, ,2 2^ 2 2f 4Y^ 4Y + 1^
"
^'""'
^M^«<'e(;;;:;:;2--(YTY^
since Y-Y* by assumption
o^ - 0. (34)
Thus with perfect positive correlation of the disturbances the money
supply in each country remains fixed, consumption is equal to outnut
in each country, and behavior is the seune as it is under flexible rates. -'^
(c) In other cases — i.e. when the correlation coefficient is less
than unity in absolute value ~ the variance of prices is greater than
it is for the single country under fixed rates and the variance of
consumption is less than it is for the single country under fixed rates.
II. B Real Disturbances .
This case will be analyzed in more detail than was done for money demand
disturbances. Accordingly, it is necessary to make strong assumntions about
-^ It will be recalled that i7ith oerfect nositive correlation of the
disturbances under flexible rates , the exchange rate remained constant.
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the distributions of the levels of income in each country. We assume that
7/income has the gamma distribution,— with parameters n > 2 and X > in
each country. For n > 1, the distribution is hump-shaped and skewed to
the right. The mean and variance of Y and Y* are given bv
E(Y^)-f-y^ E((Y^-^)2) .^»aj (35)
A
and similarly for Y*. Given the assumptions on the distributions, we now
proceed to examine the behaviour of the system under the two exchange rate
regimes.
(i) Floating Rates
Under floating rates both orices and consumption are variable. The
variance of real consumption is given by
(36)
2
°c/p
2 n
The 1price level is determined by
\' M
with resultant variance of prices
2
"P
xV
k^(n-l)^(n-2)
(li) Fixed Rates
(37)
(38)
(a) With oerfectly negatively correlated disturbances, the analysis
of section II. A (ii) (a) applies almost exactlv. The price level in
2/
See Mood, Graybill and Boes (1974, p, 112) for details on the gamma dis-
tribution. The chi-squ2u:e distribution belongs to the gamma family.
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each country stays constant but there i^ variability of consumption
for each country, equal to
^c/n " ^^vf^l-^^)' ^
""^ J - % f(l-«k)' ^ "'^' - ) (39)='^"
^V l.(l-a)V x^ V l-d-a)^/
Thia variance of conaumotion is less than that under floating
rates. Surprisingly though, although world output is constant, con-
sumption in each country is not constant. Thus smoothing through the
balance of payments is not comnlete. There would be more — though pro- i
bably not comnlete — smoothing of consiomntion in the presence of canital movement'
(b) If the disturbances are perfectly positively correlated, then
Y = Y* and the system behaves exactly like the flexible exchange
rate avstem, with the same variances of prices amd consumption in
each country as under flexible rates*
(c) With zero correlation of the disturbances, wis have
\ k(Y>Y;) ^^°'
with
al - ,
^'^'
(41)
k (2n-l) (2n-2)
Comparing (38) with (41), assuming 2M = M, the price level for the
individual country will be more stable under fixed thein floating rates
on the assumption n > 2 which is required for the Veuriance to exist
for the single country.
To calculate the variance of consumption, it is first necessary
to obtain the variance of the money stock, using (4) , (29) and (40)
.
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Y
yielding—'
-2
E(M^)
- I and a^ - 4(2-«)(2n^l) ^^^^
Then, from (3), (4) and (5),
C oiM akM
^ - Y (1-ak) + -~^ - Y (1-ak) + S^ (Y +Y*)
t '^ t ^ M ^ ^
It follows that
,a2/an
/- 3, 2
a , - —r f (1-ok) +
=/P
x' V l-(l-«)'
This variance is smaller than the variance of consumption under floating
rates but larger than the corresponding variance when incomes in the
two countries are perfectly negatively correlated.
Thus, as one would expect, with real disturbances, consumption is more
stable under fixed than floating rates, and is more stable under fixed rates,
the smaller (algebraically) the correlation between the disturbances in the
two countries,
-^ The reason for using the gamma distribution should now be clear. The sum of
independent gamma-distributed variables with the same X is gamma-distributed; the
ratio of gamma distributed variables with the same X has the beta distribution.
Thus (Y +Y*) is gamma distributed with parameters 2n and X; the ratio in (42) is
beta distributed with parameters n and n. See Mood, Graphill and Boes (1974, p. 115)
for the beta distribution.
—
' The derivation of (45) is fairly lengthy and will be supplied on request.
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II. C Active Monetary Policy,
Under fixed exchtmge rates there la room for stabilizing monetary policv
by one or both countries i the effects of one country's stabilizing actions
on the other depend critically on the correlation of disturbances in the
two countries.
At one extreme, where total world income and outnut are constant
(nerfect negative correlation of disturbances)
,
stabilization of consumption
by one country is automatically stabilizing for the other country. At the
other extreme of perfect correlation, stabilization by one country is
10,
automatically destabilizing for the other .-
With zero correlation of disturbances, there is room for the adoption
of the same monetary rule in each country such that the rule is mutually
stabilizing and more stabilizing than the adoption of the rule bv one
country alone.
Let AMG and AMG* be the policy induced changes in period t in the money
supoly domestically and in the foreign country respectively. Let M be the
world money supply in period t. Then it can be shown that
aM + AMG + AMG*
p .
^'^
^ ^. (46)
t ak(Y^+Y*) \ '
and
10/
Accordingly, as Jacob Frenkel has pointed out to me, the potential for conflict
with regard to policy depends crucially on the correlations of disturbances.
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C ctM + AMH
t t
aM + AMG
Y (1-ak) + -2 ^ ^ ak(Y +Y*)
oM^
,
+ AMG + AMG*
t-1 t t
Y^{l-ak) + (t)( )ak(Y^+Y*)
Wq want now to consider the potential for agreement on rules of the
gjunie. It can be shown that, from the viewpoint of each country, and
conditional on the assumntion that AMG and AMG* are functions only of
lagged variables, that the optimal nolicy is to keep the function (j) ( )
in (47) and the corresponding (^*( ) function each constont. If one
country ~ say the foreign country — uses a purely passive policy, it
appears at first glance that the domestic country can manipulate AMG
to keep 4" ( ) constant, even though (j)* will then be stochastic. However,
11
that implies that the asymptotic variance of the price level is infinite
i.e. that adoption of a stabilizing rule for domestic consumption bv the
domestic monetary authoritv creates price level instabilitv for the world.
On the other hand, both countries acting together can stabilize con-
sumption in each country and maintain world price stability.—^ In particular,
subject to each country's using the same rule, an optimal rule for stabilizing
consumption is the policy rule (21) where kPY is now kE(P Y ). Then, for the
—
^ At issue is the root of the difference equation for M*, since for <^ ( ) - Q,
"t-1 / "'^t \
''t
" (i-e)k(Y^-^Y*) '.
"^^ relevant difference equation is M* - (!-« + .^--^__)m*_^.
Now, in order for the expected price level not to have a trend, it is necessary
to set 9 = 1/2. But then the asymptotic variance of the price level is infinite.
12/
—
' In the sense that price level variance is finite.
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home countrY»
C
^ - Y^d-ok) + Y^ (\+Y*) (48)
yielding
2, 2
a variance which is less than that obtained under passive policy as given
13/in (45) . In addition, the variance of the price level is finite.—' If the
domestic country alone followed the rule, the variance of its consumntion
would exceed that in (49)
.
—^ The rule (21) is not the only rule which yields the variance (49) —
hence the reference to it as "an" ontimal rule. However, it is probablv the
only one of those rules which also keeps the nrice level stable.
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III. CX3NCLUSI0NS
The paner had two basic aimsj firsts to 3tudv the responses of an
economy to various rapeated disturbances under systems of flexible and fixed
exchange rates » and second, to consider potential rules of the game for monetary
nolicy under fixed rates.
The conclusions with regard to the first point are simple: if distur-
bances are monetary, then under floating rates, price level changes absorb
the shocks completely while the shocks are transmitted to consumption under
fixed rates. If disturbances are real, then floating rates prevent the trans-
mission of ^ocks abroad and result in greater instability of consumption —
even for both countries in a two country world ~ than obtains under fixed
rates. Incidentally, it is seen that results in the small country case are
equivalent to those obtaining in the two-country world with perfect negative
correlation of disturbances. The conclusions on the superiority of flexible
rates in the face of monetary shocks depends heavily on the assumption that
price level instability, per se , has no real effects. If price level insta-
bility oroducea real instability through a Phillips curve or some other
mechanism, then the superiority of floating rates in the face of monetary
shocks becomes less certain. Despite their simplicity, the conclusions differ
from those of Mundell (1960) who argues that, with caoital immobility, stability
is always greater under floating than under fixed rates.
Given the structure of the model in which money balances are restored to
equilibrium with a distributed lag, there is room for a stabilizing active
monetary policy under fixed rates with real disturbances. The extent to which
one country's stabilization policy with regard to consumption is stabilizing
for the other country depends on the correlation of the disturbances in the
- 22 -
two countries. If the disturbances are perfectly poaitively correlated, then
ono country can stabilize only be destabilizing the consumption of the other
country. If the disturbances are perfectly negatively correlated, then any
stabilization by one country is automatically stabilizing for the other
country. In the case of zero correlation of disturbances, a simple monetary
rule is derived which stabilizes consumption for both countries if used by
each.
It is also appropriate to comment on certain features of the analysis
and to consider extensions. First, it should be noted that the assurantion
of a ono-neriod lag by the authorities in adjusting the money supply is very
strong J in this model some private sector adjustments are made before the
authorities can react. In particular, under flexible rates, price level
adjustment in response to monetary disturbances occur within one period and
absorbs th«' entire shock. Under fixed rates, the monetary authorities are
not given an opportunity to react to the monetary disturbance until one neriod
later. The more usual assumption may be that the authorities respond faster
than the private sector. Evidence on the issue is hcurd to find. Second, it
should be noted that it has been assumed that mean rates of output are inde-
pendent of the exchange rate system and also, for most of the analysis, that
outnut is exogenous. Third, and most important, the analysis will be extended
to include capital movements which would presumably operate to smooth consumption
and would permit the modification of the very tight link between consumntion and
money stock behavior of the present model.
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